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STUDENT NOTE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS AND "THE
FIRST CRISIS OF THE 21ST CENTURY":
CONGRESSIONAL vs. EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY AND THE STABILIZATION
PLAN FOR MEXICO
James D. Humphrey II*
INTRODUCTION
The United States now faces a new kind of national security crisis.
While bearing many of the hallmarks of the familiar political or military
emergency - vital interests and values at stake, with inaction threaten-
ing enormous consequences - this new threat originates in economics,
specifically in international financial markets.
That economics is included in the concept of national security has
long been recognized,1 but the immediate danger that can arise from this
relationship is a relatively new phenomenon. Over one trillion dollars
changes hands each day in financial markets worldwide, virtually free of
any regulation other than market forces. This expansion of global fi-
nance today has produced new players and capabilities, but no new rules
or institutional resources, to deal with them. Meanwhile, technological
advances allow financial' power to penetrate borders effectively and
immediately. In this new era, our territory might not be taken, but our
pockets may be picked.
A series of events known collectively as the Mexican Peso Crisis
recently revealed the economic and political stakes involved. What
began as a risky gamble in Mexican domestic economic management
soon developed into a severe liquidity problem with worldwide effects.
As Mexico's illiquidity verged on default, Mexico faced not only eco-
nomic damage, but also a reversal of years of economic progress and a
fundamental challenge to the consolidation of hard won liberal political
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School (1995); M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School of
Law & Diplomacy (1994); B.A., University of Missouri (1988). The author would like to
thank Professor John H. Jackson for his advice and encouragement in the preparation of this
Note.
1. Harold Hongju Koh & John Chono Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The
Fabric of Economics and National Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 715, 716-17 (1992).
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and economic reforms. The crisis risked a "meltdown" in international
banking and financial sectors and the erosion of support for free market
ideology, as investors increasingly perceived Mexico as a tombstone
advertisement for emerging markets. These developments threatened to
reach the developed countries with whom the developing world trades
and interacts. The unprecedented scope, nature, and type of these events,
combined with the strong likelihood that such difficulties may become
frequent, caused several observers to label events in Mexico "the first
crisis of the 21st century.".
This Note discusses whether the United States can meet such a crisis
under current legal arrangements. Can officials respond quickly, force-
fully, and effectively? The Mexican Peso Crisis was the first test of this
ability, and therefore is examined as a case study. As the United States
attempted to respond to the crisis on its border, several questions about
the practical and constitutional propriety of the effort emerged. There is
clearly no longer a basic consensus surrounding security issues as exist-
ed in the Cold War years. Indeed, for the first time since the end of the
Cold War, circumstances forced a president to take unilateral action by
executive order when his appeal for Congressional intervention to dis-
solve an imminent security threat was met by a bipartisan wall of resis-
tance. Such foreign affairs situations cast doubt on venerable principles
like separation of powers and official accountability. With immediate
action necessary in this new kind of economic crisis, do these principles
threaten paralysis? What alternatives are there to protect against such a
result?
Part I of this paper begins the examination of these questions by
setting out the developments related to the Mexican Peso Crisis and its
aftermath. Part II then analyzes the responses of the United States,
which progressed through many options of differing timeliness and
effectiveness. Part III puts these developments into their legal context,
drawing on applicable principles of constitutional, statutory, and custom-
ary law. Finally, Part IV concludes by addressing the broader signifi-
cance of the crisis and possible reforms as we begin the difficult task of
reconciling legal authority and practical necessity in the new and com-
plicated area of integrated global finance.
I., THE MEXICAN PESO CRISIS
A. Background
The Mexican Peso Crisis developed suddenly, surprising many
observers, and quickly assumed potentially severe proportions. Ironical-
ly, for several years preceding the crisis, economists, politicians, and
[Vol. 17:181
Fall 1995] Foreign Affairs Powers and the Stabilization Plan for Mexico 183
international financial institutions viewed Mexico as a model developing
country. After the humiliation of the infamous debt crisis of 1982 and
the resulting "lost decade" of the 1980s, the usefulness of extensive state
intervention in the economy was finally questioned. Perhaps more
critically, new leadership cultivated the necessary political will to at-
tempt classical liberal economic reforms, despite their often harsh short-
term effects on the domestic economy.
At the center of this reform program was a disinflation strategy with
several elements.2 First, beginning in the late 1980s, Mexico privatized
approximately 1000 state-held industries; improved and increased tax
collections; and undertook a major deficit reduction program, bringing
its budget into surplus by 1992.' Second, the government, banks, union
groups, and businesses negotiated wage and price agreements. 4 Third, a
"crawling peg" managed exchange rate system linked the peso to the
dollar. This system forced the Mexican inflation rate to converge with
the much lower U.S. rate, allowing for the slow, steady depreciation of
the peso. 5 These reforms combined to bring inflation down from a 1987
high of 180 percent to an average of around eight percent in 1994.6
In addition to the pursuit of disinflation, Mexico also slashed barri-
ers to foreign investment and sought to liberalize its international trading
regime, resulting in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
membership and the conclusion of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). These developments also imposed market disci-
pline on prices and enhanced overall economic efficiency.7 Mexico also
undertook political reforms to loosen the grip of the historically domi-
nant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and improve election cam-
paigns and procedures.8 These reforms produced notable changes and
increased the attractiveness of Mexico as a trading partner and a destina-
tion for foreign investment. 9
2. See J. F. HORNBECK, CRS REP. FOR C'ONGRESS, No. 95-398E, UNITED STATES-
MEXICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS: HAS NAFTA MADE A DIFFERENCE?, at 6-7 (Mar. 15, 1995).
3. See Ramon Moreno, Mexico and the Peso, FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER (Fed. Res. Bank
of S.F., San Francisco, CA), Mar. 10, 1995, at 1.
4. These wage and price agreements were called social pacts, or pactos. For details of the
pacto entitled "Agreement of Unity to Overcome the Economic Emergency," see Ted Bardacke
and Stephen Fidler, Pacto: The Terms of the Agreement, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1995, at 4.
5. See Moreno, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id.
8. See generally K. Larry Storrs, Mexican Challenges in 1994: Uprising in Chiapas,
Assassinations, Elections, and Devaluation, CRS ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 18, 1995, at 11.
9. The fact that Mexico was the first and only developing country invited to join the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) attested to the impressive
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B. What Went Wrong?
The causes of the Peso Crisis are fairly complex, but it is generally
accepted that these center on the interrelationship between Mexico's
pegged exchange rate regime, a large current account deficit, and a risky
method of financing that deficit. By 1990, Mexico had earned the
confidence of the financial markets - enough to reenter them on a
large scale and attract substantial amounts of foreign capital for the first
time since 1982.10 In 1992 and 1993, the inflow of capital was so con-
siderable that the Mexican central bank was forced to purchase dollars
on a large scale to thwart the growing strength of the peso."
In part, investors' zeal for emerging market opportunities created
this inflow of capital. With interest rates in the United States and the
developed world relatively low, as they were until 1994, investors
sought higher returns in stable, developing countries like Mexico. Sig-
nificantly, however, most of the foreign capital entering Mexico was
portfolio capital rather than foreign direct investment. Foreign direct
investment, which is often made in plants and equipment, tends to
provide a stable and long-term commitment, while portfolio capital in
stocks and bonds is highly liquid. While foreign direct investment in
Mexico almost doubled from $2.8 billion in 1989 to nearly $4.9 billion
in 1993, portfolio investment, which constituted eighty-five percent of
total foreign investment, increased from $0.3 billion in 1989 to $27.9
billion in 1993.12
Tied to increased investment in Mexico was the excessive use of the
nearly-fixed exchange rate of the crawling peg system. While such a
system has the advantage of allowing a country to import the lower
inflation rate of the country to which it "pegs" its currency, such a
strategy is only successful with close adherence to the host's monetary
policies. 13 Mexico's inflation rate, however, remained higher than that of
the United States. In a floating exchange rate system, the peso would
have depreciated accordingly, allowing prices to equalize between the
scope of the country's changes. Lawrence Summers, Remarks Before the Washington
Exchange Regarding Mexico's Economic and Financial Situation (Mar. 3, 1995) (available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File).
10. Crisis in Mexico: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 26, 1995) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System) (available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File).
11. Id. This stimulus resulted in an increase of Mexico's international reserves from
under $10 billion in 1990 to well over $25 billion at their peak in 1994. Id.
12. HORNBECK, supra note 2, at 8.
13. Id. at 7.
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two countries. Since the bands within the crawling peg system insuffi-
ciently depreciated the peso, it became increasingly overvalued. 4
The final, and perhaps the most important, cause of the crisis was
Mexico's widening current account deficit. Throughout the 1990s,
Mexico ran a large current account deficit, reaching a level between six
and eight percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1994."5
While a current account deficit is not in itself troubling, the composition
and magnitude of the borrowing necessary to finance Mexico's deficit
became increasingly disconcerting. 6 Mexican interest rates were stable,
indicating capital was eager to enter and did not require a premium.
Moreover, a low level of capital goods imports" meant little investment
in production, which hindered potential growth and future ability to
meet debt service payments. 8 With both consumption and import substi-
tution for domestic goods increasing, an economic slowdown could be
anticipated, which would further weaken Mexico's ability to make
payments.
As long as Mexico successfully attracted foreign capital (especially
to its short-term Treasury bills, called cetes), there was little pressure to
depreciate the currency. Under the conditions described above, however,
especially the dependence on volatile portfolio capital, the system had
little capacity with which to absorb shocks or other indications of insta-
bility. When such indications appeared in early 1994, the favorable
environment that sustained the peso began to decay. Furthermore, inter-
est rates in the United States began to rise, offering more attractive
returns in a relatively stable market. More importantly, however, a
number of noneconomic developments plagued Mexico, including an
armed uprising in the state of Chiapas, 9 the political assassination of
14. Id. See generally Lessons of the Peso Crisis: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Services, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 10, 1995) (testimony of C. Fred
Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics) (available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Cngtst File) [hereinafter Bergsten Banking testimony].
15. HORNBECK, supra note 2, at 8. Trade is broadly defined to include services and
investment income and expenses. Bergsten Banking testimony, supra note 14, at 2. Observers
agree that Mexico's basic strategy was viable, at least through early 1994. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank both supported Mexico's strategy before the crisis.
Id.
16. HORNBECK, supra note 2, at 7.
17. Some leading academic economists, observing warning signs that the peso was
overvalued, pointed to the size of Mexico's trade deficit and noted 80% of the deficit consist-
ed of imports of consumption goods. See Rudiger Dornbusch & Alejandro Werner, Mexico:
Stabilization, Reform and No Growth, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 1, at 253
(1994).
18. HORNBECK, supra note 2, at 7.
19. Id. at 9.
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presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, and a looming presidential
election in an environment which portended political opening and
change.
After the assassination of Colosio, speculative pressures on the peso,
first seen in 1993, reappeared and capital flows slowed dramatically.20
Mexico responded by raising interest rates on cetes obligations and
shifting its reliance from these bonds to tesobonos.2" This shift both
reassured investors and lowered the interest cost to the government.22
Mexico also responded by using its supply of foreign reserves to defend
its currency in foreign exchange markets.23
Speculative attacks continued, and liberal use of reserves only
increased the rate of their depletion. By the time Ernesto Zedillo took
office as President on December 1, reserve levels had dropped by over
half, to about $14 billion.24 With reserves lower than the $17 billion in
foreign-held tesobonos that would be due in a matter of months, 25 mar-
kets feared further capital flight and the eventual inability of Mexico to
exchange pesos for dollars. With reserves precariously low at about $7
billion, Zedillo announced on December 20, 1994 that he was devaluing
the exchange rate by thirteen percent.26 The markets viewed this skepti-
cally, resulting in the peso immediately falling to its new lower limit.
Speculative pressures and capital flight continued. On December 22,
Mexico announced that the peso would be allowed to float.27 These
policy steps, undertaken by a new administration, were fairly rushed. No
20. Id. at 8.
21. Moreno, supra note 3, at 2-3. Tesobonos are short-term treasury securities which
paid lower interest rates and eliminated the exchange risk for dollar purchasers by indexing
the bond's worth to the U.S. dollar. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. In retrospect, the government "should have accelerated the crawl of its exchange
rate and carefully husbanded its stock of almost $30 billion then held in reserves." The Peso
Crisis and Financial Support for Mexico: Hearings Before the House Int'l Rel. Comm., 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 55, 58 (Feb. 1, 1995) (testimony of C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for
International Economics) [hereinafter Bergsten Int'l Relations testimony]. At the time,
however, the Salinas administration feared that faster devaluation would simply translate into
higher inflation and not improved competitiveness. Id. Despite warnings from observers,
Salinas insisted Mexico could ride out the market turbulence through the election, after which
confidence and capital investment would again increase. See Tod Robberson, The Mexican
Miracle Unravels, WASH. POST WKLY., Jan. 16-22, 1995, at 20. This was a false and unreal-
istic hope, given the unsustainable levels of investment which would have been required.
24. Bergsten Int'l Relations testimony, supra note 23, at 58.
25. The Egg on Zedillo's Face, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 31, 32.
26. Leslie Eaton, Mexico Devalues the Peso, Dealing a Blow to Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 1994, at DI.
27. Anthony DePalma, With Peso Freed, Mexican Currency Drops 20% More, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 23, 1994, at A 1; Tim Golden, Mexico Will Float'Its Battered Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
22, 1994, at DI.
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"flanking policies" were in place domestically, nor were foreign govern-
ments informed before the event.28 This was not yet the low point of the
crisis, but it marked the failure of Mexico's macroeconomic policy
gamble and indicated Mexico's inability to deal with the crisis alone on
prevailing terms.29
The same day the float was announced, the Mexican government
activated- the North American Swap Facility.' This agreement, created
in March 1994 to supplement the NAFTA, provides up to $6 billion
(later increased to $9 billion) in short-term funds to the Bank of Mexico,
loaned evenly by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve, together
with an additional $1 billion from the Bank of Canada." The existence
of this facility illustrates how the often implicit interdependence of
today's world is sometimes expressed in, explicit legal terms. The ar-
rangement- ensured at least some degree of U.S. involvement in any
Mexican crisis, and served as the basis for initial U.S. and international
efforts to assist Mexico.
II. THE RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES
As the Mexican crisis unfolded, following the devaluation of the
peso, the United States responded with a progression of initiatives. After
consenting to Mexico's use of its credit line through the swap facility of
$9 billion, President Clinton proposed an ill-fated package of congres-
sional loan guarantees totaling $40 billion, and, by his executive authori-
ty, eventually cobbled together a multilateral package totaling over $51
billion. The legitimacy of these actions - both in terms of their sub-
stance and authorization - were and continue to be criticized and
questioned. Before turning to precise legal arguments, this Part provides
an overview of the events leading to the final package.
A. Post-Devaluation Developments and Choices for Mexico
After the attempt to devalue the peso foundered and the currency
was allowed to float, the attention of financial markets remained fixed
28. Stephen Fidler & Ted Bardacke, Three Critical Mistakes Along a Trail to Trouble,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at 4.
29. The Egg on Zedillo's Face, supra note 25, at 31.
30. IMF Says Mexico Acted Appropriately to Devalue Peso, J. CoM., Dec. 23, 1994, at
2A.
31. Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., U.S. Treasury, Fed Create Facility to Support Peso, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 25, 1994, at A4. See also Announcements: Joint Statement of North American
Financial Group, 80 FED. REs. BULL. 522 (June 1994) [hereinafter Joint Statement].
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on Mexico's debt service, or liquidity, problems. With $17 billion in
tesobonos coming due within six months - $3.6 billion of this amount
due in January alone32 - investors were quite suspicious of the adequa-
cy of Mexico's reserve holdings. Before the crisis, Mexico redeemed
due cetes or tesobonos with the proceeds from sales of new issues, often
made to foreigners. The collapse of foreign demand for these securities
after the currency crisis, however, left Mexico with rather unpalatable
domestic financing choices.33
If Mexico could persuade a foreign country or an international
institution such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to buy bonds
or lend it several billion dollars until confidence returned, it could
reenter private capital markets. The IMF - whose purpose was to assist
countries experiencing a currency crisis - initially was unable to act
because of its limited resources, Mexico's "share" of those resources,
and its extensive procedural requirements. These limits, together with
the presence of outstanding loans to Mexico and the lack of a compre-
hensive IMF-approved economic plan, prevented immediate IMF assis-
tance. Although Mexico previously maintained a $5.4 billion credit line
at the IMF, it allowed this, and its obligation to allow IMF monitoring
of its economy, to expire in the heady days of 1993. 34 In this situation,
the United States remained the only actor with the resources and per-
haps the will to assist Mexico.
B. Administration Motivations
From the beginning, Clinton Administration and Federal Reserve
officials saw U.S. intervention as essential, and insisted from the outset
that assistance should not be used to obtain leverage on specific policy
issues, but rather to preserve larger, more important interests of the
32. The Egg on Zedillo's Face, supra note 25, at 31, 32.
33. Mexico could simply print more pesos, but this would likely cause high inflation
with all its attendant economic effects. The country could also implement exchange controls,
but this holds little economic promise and, as a reversal of free market principles, is viewed
very negatively abroad. Mexico could also borrow the money at home, but this would send
interest rates much higher and likely induce a severe recession. Moreover, as many borrowers
would be unable to pay such high interest .rates, this alternative would likely result in a
default of several private banks throughout Latin America. Considering these options, the
more likely course would have been a simple default by Mexico on current obligations, or the
extension of payment terms into the indefinite future. This would have made Mexican
obligations virtually worthless, and would have prevented Mexico from obtaining financing
on international markets for years to come. Bergsten Int'l Relations testimony, supra note 23,
at 59-60.
34. PATRICIA A. WERTMAN, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, No. 95-428E, MEXICO'S 1995
ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND THE IMF, passim (Mar. 23, 1995).
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United States.35 President Clinton pointedly emphasized this in public
addresses, stating that the Mexican crisis was "plainly also a danger to
the economic future of the United States" and peppering his speeches
with references to American strategic interests, the "national security" of
jobs, borders, economic stability, and the principle of democracy and
free markets.36 Speaking for his program during the crisis, Clinton
reemphasized that:
Our goal - our vision - must be to create a global economy of
democracies with free markets, not government-run economies;
democracies that practice free and fair trade and that give them-
selves a chance to develop and become more prosperous while
giving our own people the opportunity they deserve to reap the
benefits of high-quality high-productivity American labor, in terms
of more jobs and higher incomes.37
This highlights the Administration's concern with the Mexican
crisis' economic and political effects on the other emerging markets
with which the United States would like to trade. Other concerns includ-
ed the overall role of the United States in the world economy and its
ability to handle financial crises. The relative weakness of institutions
such as the IMF in the face of today's trillion-dollar-a-day markets led
many observers to see the U.S. response as a test of its leadership in the
new economic order.38
Significantly, while Clinton was criticized at the grass roots level for
acting to help Mexico, the financial community criticized the Adminis-
tration for not doing enough.39 This criticism went well beyond the rela-
tively simple issue of profits and losses. Recognizing the important
relationship of leadership, speed, and signals to overall market expecta-
tions and confidence, the financial community was not as critical toward
the fact of action as it was toward the manner in which it was under-
taken. In today's world, markets and analysts are overly sensitive to
signals of confidence - or the lack thereof - while the average voter,
35. Keith Bradsher, U.S. is Readying Further Billions to Rescue Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1994, at Al.
36. President William J. Clinton, America's Interest in Stabilizing Mexico's Economy,
Remarks at the Treasury Department (Jan. 18, 1995), in 6 U.S. DEP'T STATE DISPATCH 46
(Jan. 23, 1995).
37. Id.
38. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Far-Reaching Effects Seen if Mexico Rescue Is Halted, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at D1.
39. Paul A. Gigot, On Mexico, U.S. Firemen Play with Matches, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13,
1995, at A14.
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and many in Congress, are totally insensitive to, or simply unaware of,
the basic factors involved and their importance.
C. Domestic Arguments For and Against Assistance
Top policymakers decided Mexico had grown "too important to fail"
in the 1990s. In addition to the concerns noted above, advocates for
intervention pointed to Mexico's geographical position as America's
neighbor with whom it shares a 2000 mile border and the possibility of
severe immigration problems. 40 Trade issues were also a major concern,
since Mexico is America's third largest trading partner and supports
several hundred thousand export-related jobs in the United States.4'
Other bilateral issues, such as those related to the environment, narcotics
control, and other law enforcement issues might also suffer from a lack
of U.S. assistance.
Arguments against assistance were often emotional and connected
not as much to the specifics of the situation in Mexico as to partisan
and maverick politics in the United States. Interestingly, those individu-
als and groups opposing assistance largely paralleled those who opposed
the NAFTA some months before, with some explicitly stating their goal
of having U.S. participation in NAFTA reexamined in view of the
Mexican crisis. 42 Notable, too, was the opposition of several "freshman"
Republicans in the House.43 These dissenters made four basic arguments.
First, they asserted that assistance represented a "bail out" of Wall Street
investors and questioned why the United States would not let the market
take care of the problem and force the speculators to take their lumps.
Second, they queried why taxpayers should pay for Mexico's prior
mismanagement and perhaps political corruption. Third, they expressed
concern regarding the size of the problem and whether NAFTA was a
significant cause. Finally, dissenters identified the problem as one of
"moral hazard." They asserted that rescuing Mexico was undesirable be-
cause it would encourage irresponsible future behavior. We can answer
nearly all of these concerns simply on the facts.
The speed of liberalization and globalization of financial markets
has hidden both their scope and importance to everyday investors and
40. David E. Sanger, Mexico Crisis Seen Spurring Flow of Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
1995, at A3.
41. Allen R. Myerson, Peso's Plunge May Cost Thousands of U.S. Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1995, at D5.
42. David E. Sanger, Reopening Old Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at AI, C2.
43. George Graham, Freshmen Fire at Clinton's Mexican Package, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1995, at 5.
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the general citizenry. The often-heard criticism that assistance to Mexico
was a "bailout" for Wall Street overlooks the fact that those who stood
to lose were not a group of wealthy investment bank officers in New
York, but "average Americans" whose pension or 401K plan was invest-
ed in emerging market funds. The argument that the United States
should simply "let the market take care of the problem" overlooked the
fact that there was no reasonable way to negotiate with this new and
incredibly large group of creditors.
There was also much confusion over the sources of the potential
funds involved.. While a variety of schemes were considered, none ever
contemplated a direct transfer of taxpayer funds. Early news reports
perhaps provoked this confusion. The New York Times contained the
headline "U.S. is Readying Further Billions to Rescue Mexico" and the
article's lead sentence stated that "[t]he United States is preparing to
spend billions of dollars, possibly as soon as next week, to help Mexico
in its financial crisis."" Lost in the details was the fact that only curren-
cy swaps or loan guarantees were contemplated, with Mexico paying
hefty fees or offering collateral in return.45 Also unnoticed was that the
United States would likely profit from the arrangement.46 Even the funds
ultimately committed only indirectly threatened a charge to the taxpay-
ers (if the Exchange Stabilization Fund were replenished, for example),
and no proposal ever contemplated any budgetary effects.
In one area, however, the critics made a valid point: the issue of
"moral hazard." Treasury Secretary Rubin and others, while stressing
that geography, history, and trade made the Mexico plan, "unique," also
recognized that several developing countries face similar problems of
current account deficits, low reserves, and added speculative pressure
because of the Mexican crisis. While Mexico exhibits some special
factors, nothing guarantees, that other countries who lack these particular
attributes will not have others that are equally appealing. After all,
44. Bradsher, supra note 35, at Al (emphasis added).
45. In a typical Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) swap transaction, a foreign country
borrows dollars and agrees to repay them at a certain interest rate by a specified date. At the
time of borrowing, the Treasury takes possession of a corresponding amount of the foreign
country's currency, which it then invests in that country's government securities. When the
foreign country fully repays the borrowed dollars (with interest), the Treasury returns the
foreign currency. In order to ensure that these swap transactions function-to maintain orderly
markets and do not serve as financial aid, a source of repayment is secured. The Mexican
support plan included as collateral revenues from oil sales. Other sources of security are also
available. ESF swap agreements are frequently tied to an IMF stabilization program. See Op.
Off. Legal Counsel, Dept. of the Treasury (Feb. 2.1, 1995) at 5 [hereinafter Treasury Op.].
46. Helping Mexico, J. CoM., Jan. 20, 1995, at A6. C. Fred Bergsten estimated that the
likely profit to the United States would be of "the order of $5 billion." Bergsten Int'l Rela-
tions testimony, supra note 23, at 59.
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security relationships of political or economic importance for the United
States might make intervention compelling elsewhere. Secretary Rubin
implicitly recognized this difficulty, remarking to a Congressional
committee that "there is a line we cannot cross . . . just don't ask me
where it is." 47
D. Proposals for U.S. Assistance
1. Use of Existing Swap Facilities
The debate over whether the United States should assist Mexico
interacted with events in financial markets, creating a variety of propos-
als for assistance. As the prior establishment of the North American
Swap Facility indicates, some capacity already existed for dealing with
crises. This facility, while significant, was only an extension of a com-
mon - if little known - policy tool. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal
reported the establishment of the $6 billion swap limit with only a
single sentence. 48 This swap agreement was later "trilateralized" with the
inclusion of Canada, thus recognizing the economic relationships
brought about by the NAFTA, and creating the so-called "North Ameri-
can Financial Group."49 This new arrangement added a $1 billion swap
facility between the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Mexico.5°
Soon after the devaluation of the peso and the activation of the swap
facility,5 President Zedillo sought to boost confidence in Mexican
markets by accepting the resignation of his Secretary of Finance, Jaime
Serra Puche, on December 29.52 On January 3, 1995, the U.S. Treasury
and the Federal Reserve announced that an additional $3.5 billion would
supplement the $6 billion swap facility, while President Zedillo also
received commitments of $3 billion from private commercial lenders
and $5 billion from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
5 3
President Zedillo announced this package, totaling over $18 billion,
together with a hastily negotiated economic emergency plan. It was
47. David E. Sanger, The Education of Robert Rubin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at CI.
48. Vogel, supra note 31, at A4.
49. Joint Statement, supra note 31, at 522.
50. Id.
51. The Swap Facility was not drawn upon until January 9, when Mexico borrowed $500
million from the Federal Reserve and approximately $50 million from the Bank of Canada.
Ted Bardacke, et al., Mexico Uses Emergency Credit to Support Peso, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10,
1995, at 1.
52. Zedillo Unveils Economic Emergency Plan, Confirms $18 Billion Stabilization Fund,
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 5, 1995.
53. Id.
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hoped these combined developments would reestablish investor confi-
dence.'
Even in its first day, however, the plan failed to prevent negative
market reactions. While the plan proposed accelerated liberation from
government control of several sectors of the economy and a pledge that
the various loan packages would be used only to support the currency
(and not to finance the current account deficit), its estimates of inflation
rates, wage levels, currency exchange values, and the like were felt to
be unrealistic while relations with labor groups were strained.55 Markets
were not forgiving, as the peso plunged to 5.57 to the dollar from its
December 19 level of 3.45, and rates for government bonds increased
two points to the highest rate in five years.56
On January 5, Zedillo requested assistance from the IMF, while
finance ministry officials sought to create longer term bonds backed by
oil revenues as an attractive alternative for tesobono holders.5  Yet the
.markets continued to be turbulent and distrustful, and the peso and the
Mexican stock market continued to decline significantly. By January 10,
stock markets across Latin America and abroad plunged in response to
Mexico's problems, arousing fears of a "domino effect."58
2. Mexico I
With markets clearly unimpressed with the responses to the crisis
thus far, on January 12 President Clinton proposed to Congress a pack-
age of loan guarantees for Mexico totaling $40 billion. This announce-
ment was the President's first official response to the peso's problems.6
The President announced the proposal with some fanfare, including an
announcement of support from the new Republican congressional lead-
ers, Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole.6' The White House described the
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1995, at D1.
59. David E. Sanger, Leaders of G.O.P in Congress Back Clinton on Mexico, N.Y.
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Interestingly, at this point no plan had in fact been drafted. Playing
the delicate game of deterrence, officials hoped that the announcement
of the package would be enough to restore the confidence of private
investors and commercial banks, thus making the actual use of the
guarantees unnecessary. 63 Consistent with their goal of deterrence, the
Administration refused to say at the time how much the guarantees
would total,64 although word soon leaked out that the package contem-
plated $40 billion as the absolute outside figure. 65 Such an announce-
ment is troublesome because, on the one hand, the upper limit the
Administration was willing to guarantee is precisely the signal for which
the markets are waiting. To restore and increase confidence, this number
must be as large, or larger than, the crisis demands; witness the
unpersuasiveness of the original $18 billion package. On the other hand,
with congressional approval necessary, there are political, practical, and
psychological incentives for the -commitment to be as economical as
possible. Packages of an unprecedented size, then, invite a higher level
of scrutiny by both the markets and Congress.
Immediately after the plan's announcement, Mexican currency and
stock markets improved dramatically. The Mexican Treasury sold all
new tesobonos offered at auction on January 17.66 Unfortunately, this
improvement was short lived, as congressional voices began rising
against the plan, or demanding the addition of a laundry list of exacting
conditions. Importantly, skepticism of the plan had less to do with
partisan divisions than the nature of the body considering it. Despite the
support for the program by the Republican Party leadership, Republican
opposition to the plan of a Democratic president with perceived weak-
nesses was significant. The "freshmen" Republican representatives,
numbering seventy-three of the eighty-seven newly elected members of
the House, were noticeably more isolationist regarding foreign affairs
and were more single-minded in their focus on the domestic Contract
with America. 67 Opposition was noticeable in the President's own party
as well. Especially vocal were left-wing Democrats, such as the House
Democrat's Whip David Bonior (D-Mich.) who had previously teamed
63. Id. The scheme was not novel; it was based on $10 billion plan proposed by the
Bush Administration in 1992 to guarantee borrowing by Israel to finance housing for refugees
fleeing the former Soviet Union. Id. at D2.
64. Id.
65. George Graham & Ted Bardacke, U.S. Plan Bolsters Mexican Peso, FIN. TIMES, Jan
14-15, 1995, at 1.
66. Anthony DePalma, Mexico Eases Crisis, Selling All Bonds Offered, N.Y. TDMES, Jan.
18, 1995, at A3.
67. Graham, supra note 43, at 5.
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with right-wing Republicans to oppose NAFTA in 1993 and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreement in 1994.6.
Congress also sought to extract concessions from Mexico in ex-
change for assistance, resulting in endless debates over issues as diverse
as collateral, privatization, drug trafficking, the linkage of wages to
productivity, labor rights, customs rules, and aid to Cuba.69 As a result
of these demands, the Administration was never able to introduce a
single bill for formal debate. Indeed, Congress discussed over thirteen
different versions of the plan.7 ° Meanwhile, Mexican financial conditions
continued to deteriorate. Noting widespread capital flight, Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, urged Congress to support
the plan and even made a personal and ultimately unsuccessful plea to
radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh for his support.7
By January 24, with the guarantee package in doubt, the Mexican
government was unable to sell its entire allocation of tesobonos at its
weekly auction, even at six month interest rates of nearly twenty-seven
percent, an increase of over seven percent from the successful sale one
week before.72 This indicated that Mexico, which had over $25 billion in
short-term bonds due before the end of the year, had practically lost its
ability to get credit on the private international markets.73
On January 26, the IMF announced it would loan $7.8 billion to
Mexico, making it the largest loan in its history.74 With the $40 billion
U.S. package still on the table, however, the markets greeted this loan,
which was part of the original $18 billion package, unenthusiastically.75
Congressional support eroded further as the crisis wore on, with Bob
Dole stating "I don't want to cast my vote to expose the American
taxpayer to any risk at all."76 He hinted, however, at another option. The
68. Id.
69. David E. Sanger, U.S. Seeks Mexican Steps in Bid to Aid Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1995, at A14.
70. Id. Congressman Jim Leach (R-lowa) called this "[t]he most ad hoc process of
development of legislation I have experienced in my public life." Id.
71. See Nancy Dunne & Ted Bardacke, U.S. Urged to Agree to Mexico Deal, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1995, at 1. See also Courting Rush, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 6.
72. Ted Bardacke, Mexican Peso Falls as Foreigners Shun Tesobonos, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1995, at 6.
73. Anthony DePalma, Aid Doubts Strain Mexican Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1995,
at 29.
74. Anthony DePalma, LM.E Plans $7.8 Billion Loan to Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1995, at A5.
75. Leslie Crawford & Stephen Fidler, Doubts Persist Over Mexico, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
28-29, 1995, at 3.
76. David E. Sanger, Dole Warns White House that Plan to Bolster Peso Will Not Pass,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1995, at A3.
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President, he said, "needs to step up to the plate ... [s]omething dra-
matic has got to happen."
Finally, on January 30, the peso tumbled nearly ten percent to its
lowest level in history, now forty-five percent below its pre-devaluation
level.7' The Mexican stock market also fell to its lowest close since
October of 1993. 79 Reserves were rumored to be as low as $2 billion,
down from $5.5 billion on January 9, while over $1 billion in tesobonos
were to mature later in the week.80 At the White House the next morn-
ing, congressional leaders informed the President that prospects for the
plan were dim; support could be gained, they told the President, but
only though slow "in the trenches" work, literally vote by vote.8 Mexi-
co was now on the brink of default, and the Congressional loan guaran-
tee plan was all but dead. With few alternatives, President Clinton
turned to the possibility of unilateral action under executive authority
and produced his own plan of assistance.82
3. Mexico II
On January 31, the President announced a new package would be
implemented immediately, without congressional approval.8 3 Citing the
emergency nature of the situation, Clinton withdrew the $40 billion
guarantee proposal from Congress, stating that, although Congress might
eventually have passed the guarantee legislation, "it will not do so
immediately and therefore will not do so in time. 8 4
This new approach, called Mexico II, offered multilateral assistance
totaling over $50 billion, made up of several elements:
-$20 billion in swaps and securities from the United States (an
increase from the $9 billion in short term swaps previously an-
nounced);
-$17.8 billion from the IMF (an increase from the $7.8 billion
previously announced);
77. Id.
78. Anthony DePalma, The Peso Tumbles on Fears that U.S. Won't Aid Mexico, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1995, at Al.
79. Id. at C6.
80. Id.
81. Dean Foust et al., Anatomy of a Rescue Mission, Bus. WK., Feb. 13, 1995, at 32.
82. Id.
83. David E. Sanger, Clinton Offers $20 Billion to Mexico for Peso Reserve; Action
Sidesteps Congress, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1995, at Al.
84. George Graham & Leslie Crawford, Clinton Bypasses Congress to Offer Mexico $50
Billion, FIN. TiMEs, Feb. 1, 1995, at 1.
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-$10 billion from The Bank for International Settlements (an
increase from $5 billion previously announced);
-$1 billion from Canada (previously announced);
-$1 billion from a group of Latin American nations; and
-$3 billion from U.S. commercial banks (also previously an-
nounced).
85
While the plan anticipated that initial funds would be drawn from
the IMF, the Federal Reserve would also provide short term swaps. For
medium term financing, the U.S. Treasury would provide swaps with
maturities of three to five years, and securities guarantees with maturi-
ties of five to ten years, from an account known as the Exchange Stabi-
lization Fund (ESF)."6 Significantly, rather than the laundry list of
various conditions which the Congress sought to impose, the United
States conditioned these resources solely on an economic adjustment
program approved by the IMF with additional U.S. monitoring. The new
plan, like the earlier one, required Mexico to pay substantial fees and to
provide collateral from the proceeds of its oil exports8 7 In order to
announce the package quickly, precise details were left for later negotia-
tion.
Time pressures resulted in little consultation with the G7 and led to
hostility over what some saw as a fait accompli regarding the use of
IMF funds.88 This hostility, combined with the fears of several European
nations that the Mexican aid would jeopardize IMF loans to Eastern
Europe and Russia, resulted in some nations' abstentions during formal
voting.8 9
The additional commitment by the IMF was unprecedented, with the
$17.8 billion "standby credit" equivalent to 688 percent of Mexico's
usual borrowing limit.' The "exceptional circumstances" clause in the
85. K. Larry Storrs, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, CRS IssuE BRIEF, Mar.
9, 1995, at 1, 7.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. A German official noted that nations are usually given two to three weeks to
approve such aid packages, and two to three days in emergency situations. In this instance,
the official complained "we had less than an hour." Nathaniel C. Nash, European Nations
Abstain on Vote for Mexican Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at AI, A4.
89. Nash, supra note 89, at Al; Robert Chote, G7 Unity on Mexico Rescue Veils Discord
on Tactics, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, at 1.
90. IMF to Lend up to $17.8 Billion to Mexico, IMF SURVEY, Feb. 6, 1995, at 33. See
also JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
1010-28 (3d ed. 1995) (dealing with international liquidity, IMF facilities, and conditionality).
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IMF charter allowed Mexico to override normal borrowing limits. 9'
Karin Lissakers, U.S. Executive Director at the IMF, revealingly demon-
strated that multilateral organizations encountered the same difficulties
as the congressional process: "The problem the U.S. has been grappling
with is the disjunction between the speed of the markets and the speed
that deliberative bodies decide."
Like Mexico I, Mexico II was announced with a statement of sup-
port from the congressional leadership. This statement, issued by the
President together with Speaker Gingrich, Senate Majority Leader Dole,
House Minority Leader Gephardt, and Senate Minority Leader Daschle,
specifically committed the leaders to the ideas that a pressing crisis
situation existed and that the President had full authority to act in these
circumstances:
We agree that in order to ensure orderly exchange 'arrangements
and a stable system of exchange rates, the United States should
immediately use the Exchange Stabilization Fund to provide appro-.
priate assistance for Mexico. We further agree that under Title 31
under the United States Code, Section 5302, the President has full
authority to provide this assistance. Because the situation in Mexi-
co raises unique and emergency circumstances, the required assis-
tance to be extended will be available for a period of more than six
months in any twelve-month period.93
The markets showed their approval of the new plan, as Mexican
stocks soared to their biggest one-day gain since 1988 and the peso
regained more than ten percent of its value.94 Nevertheless, several
House Republicans continued loudly to oppose the plan, publicly chal-
lenging Speaker Gingrich to kill the package in what one newspaper
called a "party rebellion. 95
E. The Final Agreement
Meanwhile, the Administration turned to the negotiation of the
precise terms and conditions of the package. On February 22,' the two
91. George Graham, Lenders Flesh Out Formula for Mexico Plan, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1995, at 6.
92. Nash, supra note 88, at A4.
93. Secretary of State Warren Christopher & Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin,
Press Briefing (Jan. 31, 1995) (available in NEXIS, News Library, Wires File) [hereinafter
Press Briefing].
94. Paul B. Carroll & Dianne Solis, Mexican Stocks, Peso Post Sharp Gains Amid Relief
over New Rescue Package, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1995, at A6.
95. Major Garrett, Gingrich Faces Party Rebellion over Support of Peso Bailout, WASH.
TIMm, Feb. 10, 1995, at A10.
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countries , signed four agreements.96 These included: (1) a framework
broadly defining the terms for U.S. aid; (2) a medium term exchange
stabilization record specifying the terms for swap transactions of up to
five years; (3) an agreement specifying the terms and conditions of U.S.
guarantees on Mexico's debt securities for up to ten years including the
fee structure to cover the Treasury's risk; and (4) an oil proceeds facility
to provide an assured source of repayment. 97
These agreements started from the base of Mexico's then-developing
IMF economic stabilization plan and built upward.9 The Agreement
terms provide that Mexico will observe strict fiscal discipline by meet-
ing specific targets in terms of spending reductions, maintaining budget
surpluses, and tightening credit to shrink the real money supply. Mexi-
can Development Bank lending will be reduced, and structural reforms
and privatization will be accelerated in the key sectors of transportation,
telecommunication, and banking. The agreements established a financial
plan to govern the use of U.S. resources in restructuring and refinancing
Mexico's obligations.
To monitor the plan in an effective manner, unusual steps were
taken to obtain'data and to gain and maintain transparency: Mexico
agreed to publish the weekly balance sheets of the central bank and to
share with U.S. officials all the information necessary to monitor the
status of developments in the Mexican economy; to set up and use a
"tranche" or installment system, with prior approval. necessary for each
disbursement; and to include an acceleration clause for the event that the
use of previous drawings is found to be improper.9 The administration
assured Congress that it would share all information necessary for
effective assessment and monitoring.
To provide an additional incentive for Mexico to turn to market
sources for cheaper capital as rapidly as possible, the plan set interest
rates and fees substantially higher than the level of risk; a 2.5 percent
premium above the yield of five to ten year U.S. Treasury Notes is
applied to the first $10 billion, increasing to over three percent for the
96. Tim Carrington & Craig Torres, U.S. Unveils Rescue Plan for Mexico, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 22, 1995, at A3; U.S., Mexico Sign Agreements on $20 Billion Rescue Package, BNA
INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Feb. 23, 1995 [hereinafter Rescue Package].
97. Rescue Package, supra note 96.
98. For details on the accords, see Treasury Dept. Documents Describing Terms and
Agreements Surrounding Mexican Stabilization Package, Released Feb. 21; 1995, BNA
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Feb. 22, 1995, at M35. Unless otherwise noted, the following
discussion is drawn from this source.
99. John Maggs & Kevin G. Hall, U.S., Mexico Reach Agreement on Aid Conditions, J.
CoM., Feb. 22, 1995, at 7A.
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second $10 billion."0' The revenues generated by the crude oil and
petroleum products exports of Pemex, the Mexican state-owned oil
company, back repayment of the loans. Foreign customers of Mexico
are instructed to make payments to certain U.S. commercial banks,
which then have "irrevocable instructions" to transfer the funds to the
Bank of Mexico's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Should Mexico fail to meet its obligations, the U.S. Treasury would be
allowed to "set off" repayments against this account. 10'
F. Denouement
The next few days were still uneasy for Mexico. While the legal
structure of the stabilization agreements was now in place, markets
awaited Mexico's compliance. Mexico had yet to announce its program
of fiscal austerity and reform measures - the precise terms related to
IMF conditionality.' ° On March 9, after several consecutive days of
extremely volatile trading, the peso hit 7.7 to the dollar, its lowest level
since the beginning of the crisis, before closing at 7.45, well over fifty
percent below its level since the December 20 devaluation that triggered
the crisis.'0 3
The new Mexican domestic recovery plan was announced later that
evening, and fortunately appeared to address the concerns of financial
analysts and investors. This revision projected an inflation rate of forty-
two percent, an economic decline of two percent, and an exchange rate
of 6.0 to 6.5 pesos to the dollar."°
Although virtually all of the stabilization plan for Mexico was now
in place, the views of some in Congress remained unsettled and loudly
negative.05 Bills were introduced prohibiting any lending over $5 billion
from the ESF in a twelve-month period in the absence of congressional
approval' °6 and conditioning aid on a presidential certification that all
100. Id. at lA.
101. Id. at 7A.
102. For details, see WERTMAN, supra note 34, passim. See also Craig Torres & Dianne
Solis, Peso Hits New Low As Mexico Dithers Over Recovery Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9,
1995, at A17.
103. WERTMAN, supra note 34, at 8; Paul B. Carroll & Craig Torres,'Mexico Unveils
Program of Harsh Fiscal Medicine, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1995, at A3.
104. WERTMAN, supra note 34, at 7-8. The program also dealt with various other
economic variables, especially budget levels, tax rates, and minimum wage increases. Id.
105. See Clay Chandler, Republicans Try to Block Mexican Rescue Package; Bill Would
Reduce Access to Treasury Fund, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1995, at FI; David Wessel,
D'Amato's Bid on Mexico Loan to Continue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1995, at A13.
106. Chandler, supra note 105.
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requested. documents concerning the crisis had been provided. These
measures were often unrealistic in terms of practicality and the public
interest in confidentiality. Ultimately the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act
of 1995 established several explicit reporting requirements,10 7 but these,
compiled quietly later, contain little that could be considered unreason-
able.
Despite these sometimes reckless attacks, evidence is now accumu-
lating that the crisis has eased and that the U.S.-led stabilization effort
has greatly contributed to Mexico's partial recovery. While affected
countries have maintained often precarious free-market reforms, Mexico
has successfully reentered private international capital markets and its
economic indicators are generally well within the target ranges set by
the March IMF plan.' 8 Significantly, these targets have been maintained
without any major political or social unrest. °9
Yet the qualified success and optimism now surrounding the U.S.
stabilization plan for Mexico should not obscure the fundamental issues
and questions which linger about the rescue effort and the ability of the
United States to meet such crises in the future. Given the likelihood of
similar or related problems elsewhere in the world, and the speed and
effectiveness with which markets now operate, these questions demand
both understanding and answers.
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND FINANCIAL DIPLOMACY
The Mexican Peso Crisis not only revealed the existence of a new
kind of financial emergency; it also exposed fundamental doubts about
the legal and normative ability of the U.S. government to respond to
such a crisis in a quick and effective way, if at all. As the' above analy-
sis demonstrates, even in this unprecedented era of speed-of-light
financial firepower, the President and the congressional leadership,
cooperating across party lines and acting jointly for eighteen days, could
107. Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109
Stat.) 89.
108. See Paul B. Carroll, Mexico's Financial Crisis May Be Easing, WALL ST. J., Apr.
24, 1995, at All; LM.F. Chief Says Mexican Crisis Has Eased, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995,
at D21; Craig Torres, Battered Peso Stages Surprising Rebound, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1995,
at A14; Craig Torres, Mexican Stocks Start to Look Alive Again, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1995,
at Cl.
109. See Matt Moffett et al., No Looking Back- As the Crunch Eases, Latin Economies
Stay on Free-Market Path, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1995, at Al; Bernard Wysocki, Jr., U.S.
Corporations Step Up Investments in Latin America Despite Mexican Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
May 12, 1995, at A2.
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not garner support for a package which both declared' fundamental to
U.S. interests and foreign policy." °
To reply that this was the result of poor presidential or executive
branch leadership, or that Congress is now "isolationist," misses the
heart of the issue. These are important factors, to be sure, but the central
questions raised by the Peso Crisis are more fundamental: Is congressio-
nal-executive cooperation appropriate or desirable to effectively respond
to the new economic crises of the 21st century? If so,*in what manner
and to what degree? How should legal authority be distributed?
These questions clearly implicate the separation of powers principle,
often involved in the foreign affairs field. This is also precisely the
target of much criticism. Even after the practical advantages to the
United States of assistance became clearer, arguments persisted that the
President's use of his authority was "legally tenuous and totally unprec-
edented."'' .
Much of the criticism was visceral, often overlooking or ignoring
plain statutory authority and prior usage. While there was little, if any,
notice or criticism of the President's decision to commit $9 billion on
his own authority early in the crisis, the $40 billion and $50-billion
plans aroused much opposition regarding the lack of specific congressio-
nal appropriation. The sheer size of these later plans is understandably
somewhat unsettling, but $9 billion is also a considerable figure.
This Part seeks to examine the basis and precise legal authority for
the President's action to assist Mexico, and to place that action and its
authority in the- larger normative and constitutional context of foreign
affairs powers. This analysis will demonstrate that not only did the
President have clear, delegated statutory authority for the action ulti-
mately taken, but also that this type of response is consistent with other
constitutional and legal norms, especially for emergency or crisis situa-
tions.
A. The Normative Background: Separation of
Powers and Foreign Affairs
The U.S. Constitution's separation of powers principle has proved to
be a cornerstone of American government, especially in the domestic
field. In foreign affairs, however, the principle raises some troublesome
issues in the most vital areas of domestic security and international rela-
110. Douglas Jehl, Slow-Building Despair Led to Decision on Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1995, at A10.
111. Rubin Tells D'Amato U.S. Remains Committed to Using Fund for Mexico, BNA
INT'L BUS. & FN. DAILY, Mar. 9, 1995.
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tions. Before examining the specific constitutional issues raised by the
effort to assist Mexico, it is helpful to review the broader normative
context from which they arise.
In the foreign affairs field, both political branches of government
command, vast powers. However, in contrast to reasonably clear divi-
sions of responsibilities in the domestic area, in foreign affairs the
Constitution is "often cryptic, ambiguous and incomplete."' . The major-
ity of foreign affairs powers are exercised at least to some degree con-
currently, often with a blurring of function. While the president is the
"sole actor" in foreign affairs, he is not the sole policymaker." 3 Compe-
tition between the branches often results in skirmishes along the uncer-
tain boundaries of responsibility, and the courts' reluctance to find such
political questions justiciable means these disputes remain unresolved.
Today the balance of power is uncertain. As the Mexican crisis demon-
strated, Congress is still assertive and vocal, but it is also subject to
criticism - even by its own members - for inaction and micro-
management in its oversight of the executive.
The classic justification for the executive's traditional role as the
"sole organ" in foreign affairs" 4 is that only the president has the re-
quired expertise, secret information, and capacity for quick action." 5 In
addition to the president's responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief, he
alone negotiates treaties, appoints and receives ambassadors, and effec-
tively creates foreign policy through his conduct of foreign relations.
The Congress, meanwhile, declares war, authorizes or approves agree-
ments, regulates foreign commerce, authorizes spending, and. can pass
other foreign policy related legislation.. These powers obviously overlap.
The protections or "checks" they create are not so much the result of
.precise legal distinctions as the "institutional competition, accommoda-
tion and compromise" that they engender." 6 Indeed, Phillip Trimble has
persuasively argued that disputes over foreign affairs authority:
are mostly about influence, not law, because under a detached and
narrowly "legal" analysis, Congress has virtual plenary authority
over all aspects of foreign policy. The presidential foreign affairs
power, on the other hand, may be superficially broad and open-
112. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 2 (1973). Note that the
phrase "foreign affairs" does not appear anywhere in the Constitution.
113. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4 at 219 (2d ed. 1988).
114. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (Alexander Hamilton).
116. Elliott L. Richardson, Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 736, 739 (1989).
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ended in scope, but it is narrow in practice - its exercise is limit-
ed to unusual, particular contexts where executive initiative is
required to deal with unexpected problems and congressional
acquiescence seems likely."1
7
Trimble further argues that, as a result of the president's sole power to
officially communicate with foreign governments, a "constitutional
common law" of presidential foreign relations powers has developed
"centering on protection of presidential leadership and initiative, subject
to congressional review."
t 18
This view, while appealing, leaves unanswered a central difficulty;
namely, what if an unusual, unexpected problem requires immediate
presidential initiative, but congressional acquiescence is not likely or
immediately forthcoming? In the past, such problems were usually of a
military nature, and represented more or less direct threats to American
lives. In such circumstances even the most assertive congressional
opposition could be counted on to immediately recognize the stakes and
support "emergency" executive leadership, even if some grumbling
could be expected afterward. As the Mexican crisis demonstrates, finan-
cial issues are neither easily understood nor emotionally evocative.
Thus, the new type of economic and ideological security crisis is less
likely to engender congressional acquiescence to an executive fait ac-
compli, even when speed of response is critical.
The Mexican crisis avoided the issue of emergency powers in its ex-
treme form because the President sought congressional approval for the
loan guarantees of Mexico I and then acted pursuant to delegated au-
thority to commit funds for Mexico II. Both plans encountered norma-
tive and constitutional opposition which delayed action and worsened
the crisis. To understand the merits of these criticisms, the powers on
which they are based are summarized below, as are their implications
for future financial rescue programs.
B. Specific Constitutional Powers and Issues
1. The Power of the Purse
It is generally accepted that "Congress has power to determine the
financial resources and to shape the economic and legal devices that are
available for use in presidential action, whether in foreign affairs or
117. Phillip R. Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 750,
751 (1989).
118. Id. at 755.
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domestically.""' 9 This power is based on the appropriations clause of the
Constitution: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .... ,120 This restriction,
in conjunction with the familiar regulatory powers listed in Article I,
Section 8, gives congress tremendous power to determine which devices
the president may use or to make use contingent upon compliance with
congress' foreign policy preferences.' 2 ' In modem practice, with Con-
gress unable to anticipate precisely national security needs, "Congress
has increasingly ceded the initiative to the President and then used its
power of the purse after the fact to ratify or restrict the presidential
initiative."
Presidents retain some power in this area. For example, it is doubt-
ful that Congress can use its appropriations power to nullify an enumer-
ated power of the president, such as that to negotiate treaties. 123 More-
over, because they cannot anticipate with precision future events, Con-
gress creates various contingency funds - including the ESF, which
provided funds for Mexico II - for presidential use. Significantly, these
funds often have been used for purposes Congress never considered
when it appropriated the money. 24 For example, President Kennedy
established the Peace Corps through an executive order in 1961, but
Congress did not appropriate funds for the agency until seven months
later. In the meantime, Kennedy financed the program by using funds
from the Mutual Security Act. 125 Thus, such use is not constitutionally
unprecedented.
Other creative theories have been suggested which might affect the
president's spending authority in foreign affairs, but these have drawn
much criticism. The Reagan Administration suggested that if Congress
refuses to appropriate funds for the President's foreign policy objec-
tives, 26 the President can nevertheless pursue these objectives throughthe solicitation of funds from the private sector and from foreign coun-
119. TRIBE, supra note 113, § 4-4, at 221.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
121. TRIBE, supra note 113, § 4-4, at 224.
122. Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Com-
mander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 835 (1994).
123. Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1351 (1988). This
has never been tested. Id. The Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot punish executive
branch employees by refusing to fund their salaries. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946).
124. Louis FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 113 (1972).
125. Id. at 113-14.
126. Congress refused to do this with the Boland Amendment. Continuing Appropria-
tions Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (1984).
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tries. 127 Such a theory holds a potential attraction -for presidential finan-
cial diplomacy, since Federal Reserve funds can be considered private,
and the central banks of other countries are eager to avoid any U.S.
oversight of their activities. But while such solicitation is permissible
with congressional authorization, doing so without itin the name of the
executive's role as "sole organ" or as Commander-in-Chief, has been
harshly criticized.
2 1
Another potential avenue of executive' authority involves funds
created by income, such as the profits the Treasury and Federal Reserve
make in open market operations. Such profits caused the ESF to grow
from its original appropriation of $2 billion in 1934 to over $25 billion
at the time of the Peso Crisis. Since these profits are not appropriated by
Congress, they might not be included in Article I, Section 9's concept of
"money drawn from the Treasury." This argument is, however, subject
to the criticism that assets acquired or controlled by the president, "by
virtue of his office, must be considered to be the property of the United
States, since the President cannot hold them in any other character."' 29
Even though the funds are "created" through the actions of the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve, it is argued that
[t]his same rule must apply to the rest of the executive branch
since its members cannot have any greater rights in property than
the President would have by virtue of office. It follows from this
that funds acquired, or over which control is exercised, by virtue of
office, are public moneys and therefore covered by the Appropria-
tions clause.3 "
Nevertheless, one need only consult the debates of the founders to
see that Congress' spending control is not absolute in every circum-
stance, and that disputes about executive spending in emergencies are
not new. Professor Wilmerding's classic 1943 study of the spending
power recounts these debates and asks:
Are the laws of appropriation of higher obligation than the laws of
necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger? Must we - the language is Jefferson's - "lose our. coun-
127. Louis Fisher, How ightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 758, 758 (1989).
128. Id. at 764-65.
129. George W. Van Cleve, The Constitutionality of the Solicitation or Control of Third-
Country Funds for Foreign Policy Purposes by United States Officials Without Congressional
Approval, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 69, 80 (1988).
130. Id.
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try by a 'scrupulous adherence to the Written law" and so "lose the
law itself, with life, liberty, property, and all those who are enjoy-
ing -them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means"?
•.. [T]o most of the founding fathers, to Jefferson as well as
to Hamilton, this interpretation of 'the duties of public officers
would have been utterly repugnant. By them it was recognized that
in so complicated a government as that of the United States cases
must sometimes, perhaps often, arise, where it would become the
duty of the executive authorities, in the exercise of the discretion-
ary powers vested in them, boldly to set aside the requirements of
the Legislature, trusting to the good sense of Congress, when all
the facts of the case should have been explained, to acquit them of
all blame; and it was felt that it would be not a public advantage
but a public calamity if the Executive were to be deprived of the
means of so exercising its discretionary authority. 3 '
National debate over presidential spending powers first arose in
1793, and centered on the Giles Resolutions. Giles argued that it was
"essential" that congressional appropriation laws "be strictly observed by
the administrator of the finances."' 132 Opponents, such as William Smith
of South Carolina, argued that this proposition was unsound:
yet it must be admitted, that there may be cases of a sufficient
urgency to justify a departure from it, and to make it the duty of
the Legislature to indemnify an officer; as if an adherence would in
particular cases, and under particular circumstances, prove ruinous
to the public credit ....
Even proponents of the Resolutions admitted that
an Executive officer, pressed by some urgent and unexpected
necessity, may be induced to depart from the authorized path of
duty, and have great merit in so doing. This may be the case with
the General of an army or the Admiral of a fleet, and, though more
rarely, even with a Financier. But in such emergency, the officer
so acting will embrace the earliest opportunity to explain the mat-
ter and obtain a justification, whilst the recent feelings arising from
the occasion advocates his cause in the public mind."
131. Lucius WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF
CONGRESS TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES 3-4 (1943).
132. Id. at 5-6 (quoting 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 900 (1793)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 6 (emphasis supplied).
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These debates establish no time frame for this "explanation" and
"justification," and any such guidelines likely would be irrelevant today.
It is notable, however, that in the Mexican crisis the congressional
leadership informed the President that they could obtain the votes for
the loan guarantee package with sufficient time.
Wilmerding finds that, even though the founding era Republicans
were much more austere than their Federalist opponents in matters of
appropriation, they did not deny the executive, in an emergency, the
"right to transcend the laws of appropriation," even if constitutional
scruples had to be disregarded.
While the willingness of the executive to determine at what point he
will disregard these scruples and "throw himself on the justice of his
country and the rectitude of his motives"' 5 for foreign affairs initiatives
might vary, the principle nevertheless illustrates that the president has
both political power and liability in such situations. This is one of the
inherent checks on the office.
2. The Foreign Commerce Clause & Currency Valuation Clause
Though not directly implicated in the Mexican crisis, congress also
has broad foreign affairs power as a result of the allocation of the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . ." and the power "[t]o
99136coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin ....
The former power, used mainly in the trade field, together with the
latter, which has been largely delegated to the Federal Reserve System,
support U.S. involvement in. the worldwide network of finance and
banking,'37 and thus explicitly involve Congress in economic diplomacy
in these areas. Nevertheless, the president retains the power to negotiate
agreements in these areas, an especially important role when pursuing
multilateral solutions.
3. Custom
Custom plays a special role in the development of foreign affairs
law, especially in the realm of security, because of the practical limita-
tions on Congress' ability to prospectively delegate authority. 38 In such
situations, the president acts subject to congressional ratification or
135. Id. at 11 (quoting 5 THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 544 (H.A. Washington ed.,
1853-54)).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 5.
137. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 71 (1972).
138. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 122, at 848.
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countermand. 139 Yet when the president "acts with sufficient consistency
over time and Congress knowingly acquiesces, this interaction may
create customary national security law. The custom evidences the politi-
cal branches' joint interpretation of the President's constitutional or
statutory authority."' Significantly for the Mexican assistance program,
practice and acquiescence have been treated as a gloss on a statute:
"When the Executive has consistently acted under a statute in a manner
known to Congress, and Congress has acquiesced in the practice by
inaction, rejection of contrary legislation, or reenactment, the statutory
authority for the executive practice is implied into the statute.'
' 41
If these requirements for customary law in the national security area
are transferred to the economic security area, profound implications are
created for financial diplomacy, and specifically for the President's
action to assist. Mexico. Regarding the "consistency over time" element,
the United States has had a standing swap line with Mexico since 1941,
which has been drawn upon several times. 42 Moreover, there exists a
vast $30 billion swap agreement, known as the General Agreement to
Borrow, which major industrial countries set up in 1962 among central
banks and which continues to function to support major currency inter-
ventions. 143 These funds and agreements support the dollar by defending
other currencies.' 44 Such uses continue to the present day, with the ESF
specifically drawn upon at least forty times since 1982.141
The knowing acquiescence of Congress is also present, as operations
of the Treasury and Federal Reserve are reported on a periodic basis,
either through the monthly Federal Reserve Bulletin, periodic reports to
oversight committees, or even through regular monthly confidential
briefings of committee members concerning the ESF.'" Acquiescence to
139. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 15-16 (1990). Glennon
argues such Presidential initiatives are "contingently constitutional; their validity depends
upon congressional inaction." Id. at 16.
140. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 122, at 849-50.
141. Id. at 850. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300 (1980); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
.17-18 (1965) (holding that foreign affairs delegation takes "its content from history").
142. Treasury Department Fact Sheets on Mexico Assistance Program, Jan. 31, 1995
BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Feb. 1, 1995, at M21.
143. See MARJORIE DEANE & ROBERT PRINGLE, THE CENTRAL BANKS (1995).
144. Bergsten Banking testimony, supra note 14. This technique was especially common
in the currency crises of the 1960s, when the U.S. government regarded sterling as "the first
line of defense for the dollar" and "frequently engineered rescues for it in our own self-inter-
est." Id.
145. ARLENE WILSON, CRS REP. FOR CONG., No. 95-262E, THE EXCHANGE STABILIZA-
TION FUND, at 6 (Feb. 9, 1995).
146. Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Feb. 9, 1995) (testimony of Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury) (available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File).
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executive leadership and practice in this area can also be shown by the
persistent rejection by Congress of legislation intended to provide more
intensive congressional review. Indeed, periodic hearings on the ESF
and legislation proposing "accountability" through General Accounting
Office audits or congressional reapproval have produced virtually no
action by Congress. 47 Periodic oversight hearings (including those on
the Mexican crisis) also produced little or no change. By its inaction,
Congress has repeatedly recognized the advantages of the executive's
speed, flexibility, and resources for confidentially, efficiently, and effec-
tively carrying out emergency operations. This "customary" usage
indicates the existence of well-settled understandings between the
branches, as well as ample precedent in this area, arguably the equiva-
lent of national economic security "law."
C. Statutory Issues: Loan Guarantees and
The Exchange Stabilization Fund
The assistance plans for Mexico raised several statutory issues.
Questions concerning the earlier plan of loan guarantees by Congress
generally revolved around propriety, while questions about the Presi-
dent's initiative involved both propriety and authority. This Part argues
that the ultimate presidential initiative had solid grounding in statutory
text, history, and usage. Moreover, the debate surrounding the plans and
their different authoritative bases, together with the nature of a financial
crisis like Mexico's, argues that choice is valuable for presidential
leadership.
1. Loan Guarantee Issues
Interestingly, leaders first considered sole executive action through
the ESF and publicized this as early as December 30.'a The Administra-
tion instead decided to seek congressional involvement and approval of
the loan guarantee package for several reasons. First, they felt that
unilateral executive action, which would necessarily be unprecedented in
size, would be politically unwise with President. Clinton facing a new,
Republican-dominated Congress. Moreover, because of the congressional
leadership's early support of the loan program, quick approval seemed
likely. Officials also believed the Fund's resources, then at about $25
147. See Katherine Danzansky, More Treasury Oversight Sought, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Aug. 21, 1990, at 8.
148. See Anthony DePalma, Mexican President Outlines Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30, 1994, at D1.
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billion, insufficient to deal effectively with Mexico's problem. 4 9 In
addition, the administration had little confidence in the ability or will-
ingness of the IMF or other industrialized nations to help.'15 Finally, an
established loan program existed that provided ample precedent and
safeguards.
While the loan guarantee approach to financial diplomacy may be
preferable in terms of congressional oversight, its legal development
illustrates its disadvantages in crisis situations. For most of the post-
World War II period, the United States subsidized foreign country
borrowing through loan guarantees and low-interest loans without atten-
tion -to their budgetary implications. 151 After losses associated with the
third world debt crisis of the 1980s, however, Congress became wary of
these costs, and perhaps the uses to which the loans were put, and
established a new system of regulation under the Federal Credit Reform
Act of 1990.152 Under the Act, the budget of the U.S. government must
fully account for the net present value of the loan or guarantee - the
"subsidy cost."' 53 Congressional appropriations for this cost, then, are
subject to the unpopular label of "foreign aid."
' However, a loophole arguably remains. Subsidy cost is "equal to the
share of the loan or loan guarantee for which the U.S.; Government is
not in any way reimbursed."' Thus, when the Bush Administration
proposed a $10 billion loan package to allow Israel to finance the build-
ing of houses for refugees from the former Soviet Union, they fixed a
"fee" equal to the subsidy value of these loans to function as an insur-
ance premium, and to eliminate congressional misgivings over foreign
aid. 155 This Israeli plan served as the model for the original Mexico
plan, but invited drawn-out disagreements over the appropriate size of
the fee and the risks involved for U.S. insurance. Congress also consid-
ered supplemental fees, which would make the guarantees so expensive
149. Id.
150. Clinton Bypasses Congress, Provides Loans to Mexico, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1995,
at Al.
151. Keith Bradsher, Washington Debates the Price for Mexican Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1995, at 51.
152. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104
Stat.) 1388-610. See PATRICIA A. WERTMAN, CRS REP. FOR CONG., No. 95-I95E, U.S. Gov-
ERNMENT FOREIGN LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW, passim (Jan. 25,
1995).
153. WERTMAN, supra note 152, at 3.
154. Id.
155. Bradsher, supra note 58, at DI. The Israel loan package was later dropped when
Congress appropriated the funds for the fees on its own initiative. Id.
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that Mexico would turn to private commercial banks as soon as possi-
ble.
156
As the experience with the Mexico plan indicates, loan guarantee
programs can become so burdened with conditions as to make the plan
not negotiable within the United States government, or unacceptable to
the recipient country. These factors point to inefficiency and potential
ineffectiveness in crisis situations, and indeed proved to be such in the
effort to assist Mexico.
2. 'Exchange Stabilization Fund Issues
The President's use of the ESF provided an antidote to the limita-
tions outlined above. While the interbranch relationship governing the
use of the ESF may be less than ideal, the fund is more effective in
emergency situations and is subject to many external checks, including
customary law, direct congressional oversight, and the overall discipline
imposed by financial markets.
"The vast majority of the foreign affairs powers the president exer-
cises daily are not inherent constitutional powers, but rather powers that
Congress has expressly or implicitly delegated to him by statute."'
5 7
Often these delegations, include extraordinary amounts of discretionary
authority. Constitutional scholar Arthur Holcombe identified 1934 as the
beginning of the era of broad executive authority. 15 Interestingly, that
year also marked the enactment of the Gold Reserve Act, which estab-
lished the ESF and bestowed upon the executive branch the broad
authority typical of that era's foreign affairs delegations. 159 While many
in Congress were surprised to learn that an amount as large as $20
billion could be committed from the Fund on the authority of the presi-
dent alone, such is the result of ordinary statutory interpretation, and,
accordingly, the conclusion of legal opinions from the Department of
Justice and the Department of the Treasury."
Section 20 of the Gold Reserve Act established the ESF. Its original
purpose was to stabilize the exchange value of the dollar.16' As amend-
ed, however, the legislation authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury,
156. Press Briefing, supra note 93; Bradsher, supra note 151, at 51.
157. HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 45 (1990).
158. ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, OUR MORE PERFECT UNION 280 (1950).
159. Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 337, 341 (1934) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 5302 (1994)).
160. See Treasury Op., supra note 45; Op. Off. Legal Counsel, Dep't. of Justice (Mar. 2,
1995) (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Justice Op.].
161. WILSON, supra note 145, at 2.
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with the approval of the president, to "deal in gold, foreign exchange,
and other instruments of credit and securities the Secretary considers
necessary" if this is "[c]onsistent with the obligations of the Government
in the International Monetary Fund on orderly exchange arrangements
and a stable system of exchange rates . , "'62 In addition, the statute
provides that "a loan or credit to a foreign entity or government of a
foreign country may be made for more than 6 months in any 12-month
period only if the President gives Congress a written -statement that
unique or emergency circumstances require the loan or credit be for
more than 6 months."' 63 In 1977 it was made clear that the presidential
determination required for loans of greater than six months was "to
assure that, in general, ESF loans and credits are short-term, are used to
counter market disorder, and do not undercut the IMF's role as the
principal source of medium-term balance of payments financing.
' "64
To carry out the provisions under this section, Congress initially
appropriated $2 billion from the profits realized from the revaluation of
the gold holdings of the United States. 65 Originally established as a
two-year fund, the ESF was reviewed periodically until it became per-
manent in 1945 under the Bretton Woods Agreement Act. At that time
$1.8 billion of the Fund's holdings were paid to the IMF as part of the
U.S. subscription."6 The $200 million remaining in the Fund was to be
"extremely useful in supplementing the work of the International Mone-
tary Fund with respect to those countries that have close economic ties
with the United States, and particularly those with which we now have
bilateral stabilization agreements."' 67
The Fund receives income from interest on investments and loans,
as well as from net gains made in foreign exchange transactions. 168 At
the time of the Mexican crisis, the ESF held approximately $25-30
billion.
169
The statute is also clear that the ESF is under the exclusive control
of the executive branch, subject only to certain monthly and annual
reporting requirements. Section 5302(a)(2) states:
162. 31 U.S.C. § 5302(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 5 (analyzing S. REP. No. 1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976)).
165. Treasury Op., supra note 45, at 3.
166. Id.
167. See Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 629, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1945)). The authority
for these bilateral swap agreements is derived from § 14(e) of the Federal Reserve Act, 12
U.S.C. § 358 (1994).
168. Treasury Op., supra note 45, at 4.
169. Id.
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Subject to approval by the President, the fund is under the exclu-
sive control of the Secretary, and may not be used in a way that
direct control and custody pass from the President and the Secre-
tary. Decisions of the Secretary are final and may not be reviewed
by another officer or employee of the Government.17
The basic challenge to the assistance plan for Mexico revolved
around the duration and type of credit provided. Mexico II provided for
short- and medium-term swaps,. as well as securities guarantees with
maturities of five to ten years.
The statutory authority providing for the type of assistance is
broad. 71 Furthermore, the statute specifies no time limit other than that
requiring presidential certification of "unique or emergency circumstanc-
es" if loans or credits are to be for more than six months. 7 1 Congress
has never placed any term limits on any ESF loans, and indeed has
recognized that longer-term efforts are sometimes necessary in "unique
or exigent circumstances ... includ[ing] natural disasters, trade embar-
goes, unforeseen economic developments abroad, political assassina-
tions, or other catastrophic events.' 73 Indeed, Congress' certification re-
quirement does not restrict presidential authority, but rather requests
"only that the President recognize that extraordinary measures be re-
served for extraordinary situations."1 74 In the Mexican situation, Presi-
dent Clinton submitted the required notification to Congress on
March 9, 1995.171
Oversight is always an issue of concern to Congress, but the explicit
unreviewability language in the statute, together with customary practic-
es stretching over sixty years, acknowledge the freedom and confidenti-
ality the executive must have in the highly complex area of foreign
exchange market stability. Congress also recognizes that expertise and
perspective are necessary to determine whether and when particular
circumstances are unique or sufficiently serious to warrant intervention.
It is clear that both approaches to the crisis were legally sound, and
both had distinct advantages and disadvantages. The loan guarantee
program ensures congressional cooperation, but that cooperation comes
170. 31 U.S.C. §5302(a)(2) (emphasis added).
171. See 31 U.S.C. §5302(b).
172. Id.
173. Treasury Op., supra note 45, at 11 (quoting S. REP. No. 1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1976)) (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. See President's Message to Congress on the Financial Crisis in Mexico, 31 WKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 390 (Mar. 9, 1995).
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at a high cost, especially in emergency situations. Similarly, while the
use of the ESF ensures a faster, highly tailored response, it risks over-
sight disputes and places on the executive a high degree of political risk.
IV. RECONCILING AUTHORITY AND NECESSITY
A. Achieving Accountability Without Paralysis
Mexico's. sudden and severe difficulties were labelled the "first
crisis of the 21st Century" for the United States with good reason.. The
crisis demonstrated that, in contrast to the military security issues which
dominated the Cold War era, the largest challenges we now face deal
with economic security. International financial markets, at least for the
present, have outrun the regulatory ability of national governments. But
while markets are extremely large and diffuse, unilateral and multilateral
power exist to meet the crises they create. The Mexican Peso Crisis
questions whether governments can translate that power quickly into an
effective, response, and whether any particular response is appropriate.
Answering these questions requires a careful rethinking of the
relationship of authority and necessity in economic security issues.
Obviously, reconciling authority and necessity neatly is impossible in
this "frontier" area of concurrent power; the tension results not so much
from the subject matter or situation, as from the Constitution itself.
Guiding this reconciliation are the twin principles of timely action and
accountability, and the Mexican crisis provides lessons regarding both.
The new kind of crisis we face is not only economic, but also
psychological; it is a crisis of market confidence. While Congress main-
tains control of foreign affairs largely through its appropriations power,
and seeks to limit disbursements to both tighten control and maintain
budgetary discipline, this new kind of crisis requires that vast resources
will be committed. At least initially, the fact of the assistance is more
important than its details. In such circumstances, large off-budget con-
tingency funds and the broad executive authority to use them, subject to
later congressional oversight and political and market risk, appear neces-
sary and advantageous.
Such crises also require careful consideration of timing - specifi-
cally, the need for speed. To paraphrase Robert Bartley, we think of
trade as it slowly splashes along in ships, while its inevitable comple-
ment - capital - now travels at the speed of light.176 Clearly, to cope
with this reality, the government must be able to respond in a timely
176. Robert L. Bartley, The Challenge of Capital Flows, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at
A18.
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manner, relative to the circumstances. The recent experience with Mexi-
co demonstrates that these new crises require executive leadership and
authority.
However unhappy it may be, under the Constitution's separation of
power structure, democracy comes from the Congress, while security
comes from the President. 77 History provides a long list of the "undem-
ocratic" actions of presidents taken in the name of national security, but
such questionable unilateral actions in the economic field are clearly less
desirable due to constitutional, political, and practical limitations. It is
important to remember that "undemocratic" does not mean "unconstitu-
tional." The framers believed the president could use military force "to
repel sudden attacks"'' 78 and an appropriate analogy could be made to
economic emergencies, especially those, like Mexico's, that threaten
global instability. Even though the president does not enjoy a Com-
mander-in-Chief power over economic affairs, the key question is
whether vital interests are implicated. Laurence Tribe has argued in the
national security context that the fact that a measure deals with "securi-
ty" does not justify unilateral action, but rather "[t]he key question
should be whether waiting for congressional action would do irreparable
harm to the vital interests that executive intervention is designed to
serve."
179
While executive action may be a useful preventative to paralysis, the
problem of accountability remains. Congressional acquiescence would
restore the democratic element, to the decision-making process. The
Mexican crisis points to another difficulty: What if immediate acquies-
cence is not likely, or not forthcoming? Can the markets involved
survive the delay until decision by Congress? These difficulties illustrate
the value of statutes providing broad authority to act and carefully
circumscribed review and oversight provisions for those cases in which
the president is willing to risk political capital.
The existence of such broad authority rests on sound principles and
policy considerations. First, the decision to take action, and to select the
appropriate form of that action, is the heart of the executive function.
Trimble argues that "It]he foreign affairs prerogative protects the ability
of the Executive, subject to ex post facto review by Congress, to deter-
177. Joseph L. Nogee, Congress and the Presidency: The Dilemmas of Policy-Making in
a Democracy, in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 189, 199
(John Spanier & Joseph Nogee eds., 1981).
178. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Ferrand ed.,
1911).
179. TRIBE, supra note 113, § 4-7, at 233, n.13.
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mine within each particular instance what action to take or not to take in
communicating and negotiating with foreign governments and other
international actors to settle pressing international problems."'' 80 Second,
beyond the familiar justifications of The Federalist, the structure of the
presidency lends itself to providing better national leadership than the
Congress'' in terms of information resources, bureaucratic structure, and
electoral incentives. As Steven Calabresi recently argued, national
foreign policy initiatives by the President necessarily have quite differ-
entiated regional impacts' 82 which risk burdening one area. Normatively,
then, these require the assent of Congress to counter the possibility that
the president might "write off' one region to gain the support of the
others. 8 3 However, foreign policy implementation, those acts over which
Congress has primary authority,1 involve a reversal of these risks, as
regionally biased committee chairs and Members try to influence a
nationally approved policy to benefit their own electoral districts.'85 The
president, with his national perspective, is called for as a check on this
tendency. Financial assistance plans such as the one in Mexico involve
national interests but congressionally controlled means, and thus argue
for a broad presidential role despite the "plenary" spending authority of
Congress.
The ESF statute provides for accountability in terms of periodic
reporting requirements, although several other devices also exist to
ensure effective oversight. In addition to normal channels of political
accountability, 8 6 the executive faces other disciplining factors because
of the nature of the crisis. First, because of the nature and extent of
international financial markets, management errors and attempts to
"fool" them are punished with alacrity. The markets' thirst for informa-
tion means that any attempt to conceal relevant information is usually
.short-lived. Thus the market plays an oversight role of its own, and
presidents will pay a heavy price for ill-considered commitments. Sec-
ond, because cooperation with Congress aids confidence and promotes
deterrence, it is sought after. Third, spending plans associated with
assistance efforts must be known publicly to be effective in promoting
180. Trimble, supra note 117, at 757.
181. Nogee, supra note 177, at 193.
182. Consider, in this regard, NAFTA, defense buildups, base closings, embargos and
plant seizures.
183. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23, 87-88 (1995).
184. A good example of this is Congress' spending power.
185. Calabresi, supra note 183, at 87-88.
186. These include popular support, future cooperation of Congress, and the like.
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confidence; that hidden or secret funds would be useless makes over-
sight easier. Finally, the multilateral character of assistance programs,
which involve not only the IMF, but also other central banks and our
own independent Federal Reserve and related bodies, provides account-
ability.
B. Reforms
A crisis presents opportunities in addition to dangers, and useful
proposals for reform are beginning to.emerge. Fundamental to reform at
all levels is obtaining a better understanding of the factors that produced
- and ameliorated - the crisis.
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The main challenge of reform is to modernize institutions with
something like an international bankruptcy or liquidity mechanism
without creating an incentive for countries who know assistance will be
forthcoming to persist with bad policies. In view of its original purpos-
es, the IMF will likely be at the center of reform efforts. The- G-7
included it in agreements concerning the bare outlines of a new "safety
net."'88 There is, however, much opposition to an increase of the Fund's
role. 89 Such international reform efforts, however, have the advantage of
shared responsibility for financial assistance (thus lessening financial
spheres of influence), a more broadly based leverage on principles (such
as free market reforms), and even have a better record of receiving
repayment than do individual countries.' 9° Proposals include various
forms of "deposit insurance" or the creation of an "International Bond-
holders Insurance Corporation" to monitor and value countries' econom-
187. Some countries view currency speculators as the cause of the crisis: Asian central
bankers held meetings to share the identity of these persons, ,while Malaysia proposed to fine
and even "cane" violators! Floyd Norris, Mexican Shadow Falls on Emerging Markets, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 1, 1995, at Cl, C6. Such efforts, of course, address the symptoms rather than the
causes of the crisis.
188. John Wilke, G-7 Finance Ministers Say They Want Dollar to Rise, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 9, 1995, at A3.
189. These arguments are based on several rationales, including sovereignty, secrecy
concerns about data, the IMF's fundamental legal character as a rule-based organization and
the risks to its legitimacy by involvement with highly political decisions. See Tim Carrington,
IMF Says It Needs More Power, Money to Handle Crises like the One in Mexico, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 3, 1995, at A2; A Fork in the IMF's Road, EcONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1995, at 14; Hazard-
ous Morals, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 1995, at 19; Why Can't a Country Be Like a Firm?,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 22, 1995, at 79. The G-7 summit at Halifax in June of 1995 took no
concrete steps toward reform, despite much discussion. See Paul Lewis, The Group of Seven
Calls for Measures to Avert Currency Crises, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1995, at 33.
190. Proposed Aid to Russia and Other States of the Former Soviet Union: Hearings of
the Int'l. Dev., Fin., Trade and Monetary Pol'y Subcomm. of the House Banking Comm.,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 81 (Apr. 29, 1992) (statement of Rep. Jim Leach).
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ic policies.191 The presence of international facilities does not, however,
guarantee their use, and the United States must be prepared to act or
seek a coalition unilaterally, just as it does in the military context.
The ESF and its related statutory authority provide a flexible and
effective method to respond to the crisis, and should be preserved. This
alternative is not ideal, however, and congressional cooperation should
be sought when possible. Thus, the loan guarantee mechanism should
also be preserved as an alternative method of assistance, and the presi-
dent should be allowed to choose the means best suited to the situation.
This might also have a collateral benefit of decreasing the harsh condi-
tions congress attaches to loan guarantees as the president could opt for
the ESF alternative if these conditions were too burdensome.
Some substantive changes also can be suggested. To solve the prob-
lem of lack of initiative for an unpopular program, congress could
require the president to make a more .detailed showing of "unique or
exigent circumstances," which could then be tested by an adversarial
congressional review. Such a procedure, suggested for another emergen-
cy economic powers statute by Harold Koh,192 might serve an education-
al and leadership function, as well as provide for less biased and super-
ficial "sound bite" type debate. Similarly, a core consultative group
could be established, perhaps including Congressional or Federal Re-
serve officials with specific expertise, who could provide a balanced and
broad-based opinion on whether an economic emergency existed and
whether such warranted a response from the United States. The group
would add a congressional or independent voice beyond-the party lead-
ers' to the executive branch choice-of-means discussion, and would
promote a broader, more centralized congressional response. Such a
group could also be the recipient of sensitive data from other central
banks or multilateral institutions; its creation could thus supplement
reforms recognizing interdependence and the need for shared informa-
tion at the international level.
CONCLUSIONS
The Mexican Peso Crisis may have been the first economic emer-
gency of its kind, but it almost certainly will not be the last. In the ab-
sence of international institutional capabilities equal to the task, the
United States must stand ready to intervene immediately, forcefully, and
effectively to protect its national interests when they are threatened by
global financial developments.
191. )illiam Cline, Managing International Debt,'ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at 17, 19.
192. KOH, supra note 157, at 196.
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Confronting such emergency situations in an atmosphere of shared
but separated powers is difficult, as the Mexican Peso Crisis demon-
strated. In such circumstances, power sharing is implicit; the difficulty
arises over when cooperation or oversight should begin, and over the
scope of the executive's independent initiative. The Mexican crisis
revealed that the executive branch was best suited, both structurally and
politically, to determine the need for assistance in a timely manner. The
crisis revealed the severe weaknesses of Congress, while emphasizing
that body's important confidence building and oversight roles during the
negotiation of framework agreements and the implementation of execu-
tive policies.
In sum, the flexibility inherent in having a choice of means allowed
the President to respond to the crisis adequately, if somewhat belatedly,
and to protect what he believed were politically defensible interests of
the United States. Such a result is consistent with our "checks and
balances" system of government. Congressional critics should appreciate
the useful discretionary role of the executive branch and recognize its
historical, normative, and legal justifications. Moreover, a better under-
standing by both branches of economic events and financial policy tools,
as well as the development of an enhanced role for multilateral institu-
tions, would be useful improvements. Such efforts and reforms will be
necessary as the United States assumes its responsibilities for economic
security and world leadership in the next century.
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